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ABSTRACT
We present the ﬁrst systematic analysis of state policies limiting prescrip-
tion drug access under Medicaid during 1990–2004, documenting their impact
on states’ Medicaid prescription spending growth. We see substantial variation
inthenumberandtypeofpoliciesusedbystates,butaclearupwardtrendinre-
strictions over time. Analysis of state level annual spending growth shows that
these restrictions have in general helped contain Medicaid prescription drug
costs and that some approaches, such as the use of preferred drug lists (PDLs)
and tiered copayment systems, may have been more effective than others.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 60 million low-income individuals receive their health insurance coverage
through Medicaid, with the states and federal governments spending an estimated $300
billion per year on the program. This makes Medicaid the largest single health insur-
ance program in the United States (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO), 2006). Medicaid
program costs have increased dramatically in recent years, and current projections sug-
gest that total costs will double over the next 10 years (CBO, 2006). Concerns about an
impending ﬁscal crisis have led to increased attention to policies aimed at managing
Medicaid costs.1
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FIGURE 1
Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditures, 1992–2003
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Source: Author calculations.
Spending on prescription drugs has been the fastest-growing expense category in Medi-
caidinrecentyears,withexpensesgrowingonaverageover16percentperyearbetween
2000 and 2004 (Holahan and Cohen, 2006). This rapid cost growth has resulted in pre-
scription drug costs for state Medicaid programs in the neighborhood of $30 billion per
year (Holahan and Cohen, 2006). During the same time period, overall Medicaid spend-
ing grew a little over 9 percent per year (Holahan and Cohen, 2006). This growth rate
differential has led to drug costs rising from 7 percent of total Medicaid expenditures in
the early 1990s to over 14 percent in recent years.2 These trends are displayed in Figures
1 and 2. Figure 1 shows annual nominal prescription drug expenditures and Figure 2
shows the annual share of total Medicaid costs accounted for by prescription drugs, for
1992–2003.
Policymakers’concernsaboutmanagingtheuseandcostsofMedicaidprescriptiondrug
beneﬁts have grown in response to these trends. Surveys of state Medicaid programs
in 2000, 2003, and 2005 concluded that states had already introduced many policies to
control their drug beneﬁt costs, and the number of states implementing such policies
has increased each study year (Crowley et al., 2005).3 In ﬁscal year 2005, 43 states
2 Several papers document in more detail the growing costs of Medicaid prescription drug costs.
Tepper and Lied (2004) show trends in Medicaid prescription use and costs for 1985 to 2001.
Baughetal.(2004)providefurtherbreakdownsofthistrend,showingforexamplethatspending
amounts are the highest for central nervous system drugs. The most detailed study of trends
is Banthin and Miller (2006) who use Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 1996–2002 to look at
usage of any Medicaid prescriptions as well as the number of drugs conditional on usage, by
drug category as well as by population subgroups. They ﬁnd that much of the growth comes
from the use of certain drugs such as antidepressants and from the use of newer medications.
3 FederalrulesdonotrequirestatestocoverprescriptiondrugsundertheirMedicaidplans,butall
states currently provide this beneﬁt to most Medicaid beneﬁciaries. Federal law sets minimumDO STATE COST CONTROL POLICIES REDUCE MEDICAID SPENDING 41
FIGURE 2
Medicaid Prescription Drugs as Share of Total Medicaid Expenditures, 1992–2003
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implemented policies to control Medicaid prescription drug costs. When asked whether
states planned on adopting additional policies of this nature in 2006, 41 states indicated
yes (Smith et al., 2005). The Medicaid Commission’s 2005 report to the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services recommends several ways that states can
further reform their pharmacy beneﬁts, for example, by using a three-tiered copayment
system(MedicaidCommission,2005)bywhichdrugsthathavehigherpricesarecharged
higher copayments.
Yet, there has been no systematic documentation of states’ use of Medicaid pharmacy
restrictions,4 or any study of how these measures affect growth in Medicaid prescription
drug costs.5 This is a deﬁciency in the literature because Medicaid pharmacy beneﬁt
restrictions are an important and growing phenomenon in the efforts to control state
spending, and their effectiveness should be evaluated.6 It is also important because
requirements for prescription drug coverage for those states choosing to provide drug beneﬁts,
but states are allowed signiﬁcant ﬂexibility in administering their programs. Thus, the nature
and stringency of state policies used to control prescription drug spending vary across states
and over time.
4 Morden and Sullivan (2005) look at state prescription drug policies in 2004, and Crowley et al.
(2005) update previous surveys in 2000 and 2003 with new data from 2005.
5 Onestudy(FischerandAvorn,2003)calculatedthehypotheticalﬁnancialimpactofstates’greater
useofgenericdrugpoliciesandfoundthatstatescouldpotentiallyrealizeanincreaseinsavings
by implementing these policies in their Medicaid program.
6 Examples include Texas and Kentucky’s exclusion of the antipsychotic medication Zyprexa
from their preferred drug lists; Koyanagi, Forquer, and Alfano (2005) research states’ use of
cost control policies on a selected group of psychiatric medications; and Litchtenberg (2005),
Murawski and Abdelgawad (2005), and Virabhak and Shinogle (2005) looked at the effects of
implementing preferred drug lists in a state.42 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
several of these cost control tools are used by Medicare Part D plans, into which
Medicare–Medicaid dual beneﬁciaries were moved beginning in 2006 (Gold, 2006;
Hoadley et al., 2006).
This article provides the ﬁrst systematic documentation and analysis of state policies
limiting prescription drug access under Medicaid. We present an analysis of changes
in states’ Medicaid prescription drug policies over the period 1990–2004 and assess
how these changes affect the growth in Medicaid prescription drug spending in the
states during 1992–2003. Our focus is on state policies that have the most direct bearing
on Medicaid beneﬁciaries’ access to prescription drugs. These include copayments,
prescribing limits, mandating the use of generic drugs, step-therapy requirements, prior
authorization of drug use, and preferred drug lists (PDLs).7
Understanding the use and effectiveness of cost control policies is of particular impor-
tance because of their potential to reduce beneﬁciaries’ access to needed prescriptions
and the possible negative consequences of reduced access. Research has suggested that
Medicaid beneﬁciaries perceive poorer access to prescription drugs than those with
private insurance. Using data from 1994, Berk and Schur (1998) found that after control-
ling for health status, Medicaid beneﬁciaries have the same access to a usual source of
care and a similar number of doctor visits as those with private coverage but are twice
as likely to report not being able to obtain prescription drugs. This study found that
7 percent of those with Medicaid were unable to obtain a prescription drug when
needed, compared to 2.9 percent of those with private coverage or 13.6 percent of those
who had no coverage. Estimates based on the 2000 and 2003 Community Tracking
Study (CTS) showed much higher percentages of people unable to afford prescription
drugs, and similar disparities between Medicaid beneﬁciaries and the privately insured
(Cunningham, 2005). Coughlin and Long (2005) analyzed data from the 1999 and 2002
National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) and found that Medicaid beneﬁciaries
reported worse access compared to low-income insured individuals on two measures—
access to dental beneﬁts and prescription drugs. The authors infer that states’ ﬂexibility
with the prescription drug beneﬁt including an increase in cost containment policies has
led to poorer access for Medicaid beneﬁciaries.8
Our article is organized as follows. The next section describes the construction of our
data set documenting states’ Medicaid prescription drug policies over time and uses
those data to analyze trends in states’ use of pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions. We ﬁnd an
increased use of restrictions in nearly all areas, especially in utilization management
policies, but substantial variation across states. The third section analyzes the effects
of these state policies on the growth in state Medicaid prescription drug spending. We
ﬁnd that beneﬁt restrictions have contained expenditure growth and that the newer
7 There are other efforts being made to control Medicaid drug costs that we do not discuss as they
impact the cost per prescription to Medicaid rather than the number or type of medications
used by patients. Examples are changes to the reimbursement formula from pharmaceutical
companies and extension of the rebate program to Medicaid managed care. However, the
effects of these policies are not reﬂected in the cost data that we employ in our analysis.
8 One study that found no differences in access is Elam (2004). Using 1996 Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey data, this study found that Medicaid beneﬁciaries had about the same access to
antidepressant drugs as those with private coverage.DO STATE COST CONTROL POLICIES REDUCE MEDICAID SPENDING 43
utilization management policies have been most successful in this regard. The fourth
section analyzes growth in total Medicaid spending to examine whether the reductions
in Medicaid drug spending are offset by increases in other spending areas. We ﬁnd that
reductions in drug spending associated with pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions appear to
translate into reductions in overall spending as well. The ﬁnal section summarizes and
interprets these ﬁndings.
STATE MEDICAID PHARMACY BENEFIT RESTRICTIONS
We compile data from secondary and primary sources to analyze state Medicaid pre-
scription drug policies over 1990–2004. We track the prevalence and stringency of each
speciﬁc policy used by the states to control drug usage and cost, as well as the state’s
overall policy approach.
Data
Theprimary source of information used increating ourpolicy database isPharmaceutical
Beneﬁts Under State Medical Assistance Programs, a report published annually by the
National Pharmaceutical Council (NPC) based on their surveys of states. Data on PDLs
werenotavailableintheNPCreports,butwewereabletoobtainthesefromtheNational
Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) and conﬁrmed the year of PDL implementation by
searches of states’ Medicaid websites.
The NPC reports are available in hard copy (1992–1999) or Adobe (2000–2004) formats
and are organized into tables of state comparisons of individual policy variables. We
systematically coded and created a state by year database of regulations suitable for
researchfromtherawNPCdatatables.Thedatawerecheckedagainstandsupplemented
with data from other published sources where available.9 Last, we created individual
state proﬁles from the information we gathered and mailed this information to each
state’s Medicaid ofﬁce to verify their accuracy and gather information where there were
gaps in our data. With some exceptions, we were able to gather data on each state policy
for every year in the study period 1990–2004. Our database allows us to provide a more
complete picture of policy trends and the combination of tools used at the individual
state level in ways that were not possible earlier. For clarity of presentation we display
data here for only four selected years: 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2004.10
Trends in States’ Use of Speciﬁc Policies
We analyze trends in states’ use of policies after separating them into four broad areas:
copayments, prescribing limits, mandating use of generic or low-cost drugs, and prior
authorization policies (including the use of PDLs).11 Our data include 48 states plus the
9 Kaiser Family Foundation surveys of the states (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the
Uninsured, 2001, 2003) provide the most comprehensive comparison sources.
10 We choose these years in order to report at relatively evenly spaced intervals, subject to the fact
that our data span the period 1990 through 2004; we choose 1996 speciﬁcally because this is the
ﬁrst year that NPC reported information on tiered copayments and fail-ﬁrst policies.
11 In the sections that describe the Medicaid regulations regardingstate pharmacy beneﬁt policies,
we draw heavily on Kaiser Reports (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured, 2001,
2003, 2005).44 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
TABLE 1
States’ Use of Medicaid Prescription Restrictions, Selected Years, 1990–2004
Number of States Median Value
Policy 1990 1996 2000 2004 1990 1996 2000 2004
Any copayment 20 31 32 40 $1.00 $1.50 $2.00 $3.00
Tiered copayment N/A 3 4 17 $2.00 $2.00 $3.00
Limits on prescriptions
per month
29 39 40 43 5 5 5 5
Limits on quantity per
prescription
12 13 12 15 1 month 1 month 1 month 1 month
Mandatory generic
substitution
12 27 33 41
Any fail-ﬁrst
requirement
N/A 8 9 14
Any prior authorization 40 40 43 49
Preferred drug list (PDL) N/A 0 0 30
Source: Author calculations from NPC data. The 1990 prior authorization data are for 1991, ﬁrst-
year data are reported; 1996 is ﬁrst year of reporting for fail-ﬁrst data. Median values calculated
from states that have the policy. Copayment amounts are the maximum copayment. Prescrip-
tion quantity limits are typically expressed as number of days per prescription; median limit is
expressed here in months. Data on tiered copayments, fail-ﬁrst requirements, and PDLs are not
available prior to 1996. Arizona and Tennessee are omitted from the table.
District of Columbia. We omit Arizona and Tennessee because their Medicaid programs
are set up under waivers that allow them to differ along many dimensions relative to
otherstates.Wedescribethetrendsforeachpolicyinthesectionsthatfollowandpresent
summary data in Table 1 on the prevalence of each policy over time.
CostSharing. UndercurrentMedicaidlaw,statesarepermittedtoimplement“nominal”
cost sharing for certain groups of beneﬁciaries. This has been deﬁned as copayments
between $0.50 and $3.00 per prescription, though the federal government12 has granted
waivers allowing cost-sharing levels up to $5.00 per prescription.13 Copayments may
be used to shift costs to beneﬁciaries and to direct them toward cheaper drugs. Federal
laws that prevailed during the study period prevent states from denying a beneﬁciary
accesstoaprescriptionbecauseoffailuretopaythecopayment,butthereisevidencethat
copaymentsarebinding(Nelsonetal.,1984;StuartandZacker,1999),perhapsbecauseof
stigma costs involved in making such appeals to pharmacists. The Deﬁcit Reduction Act
12 State programs are overseen by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS).
13 Copayments may vary with eligibility status and service provider. Under the law during the
study period, cost sharing does not apply to drugs used by pregnant women and children.DO STATE COST CONTROL POLICIES REDUCE MEDICAID SPENDING 45
of2005substantiallyincreasestheallowablescopeofcostsharingandallowspharmacies
to deny access to drugs for those who fail to pay copayments, beginning in 2006.14
The data in Table 1 demonstrate that prescription drug cost-sharing requirements have
become increasingly prevalent over the study period: the number of states with cost-
sharing has doubled since 1990. In 1990, 20 states required a copayment from bene-
ﬁciaries to receive prescription drugs. By 2004, the number of states with copayment
requirements had grown to 40, with 8 states adding copayments between 2000 and
2004.
The table also shows an increasing use of tiered copayment systems that require higher
copayments for brand name drugs. In 1996 (the ﬁrst year data on this measure are
available) only three states charged differential copayments for brand-name and generic
drugs. By 2004, 17 states employed a tiered copayment system. The vast majority of
states adopting the tiered systems have done so since 2000, when only four states used
tiered copayments.
In addition to introducing new cost-sharing requirements, states have greatly increased
the levels of prescription drug copayments since 1990 (Table 1). In 1990, 18 of the 20
states with cost-sharing had payment levels of $1.00 or less. In 2004, only 5 of the 39
states with cost-sharing had copayments of $1.00 or less, 18 had copayments ranging
up to $3.00 and 4 states went to $5.00. The median of the highest allowed copayment
requirement among states with cost-sharing tripled during this time period, rising from
$1.00 in 1990 to $3.00 in 2004. Even after taking into account inﬂation, this amounts to a
210 percent real increase in the median (maximum) copayment amount.15 In states with
tiered copayment systems, the difference in amounts required for brand versus generic
drugs has increased over time. In both 1996 and 2000, the median copayment amount
for brand-name drugs among states that used a tiered system was $2.00, whereas the
median copayment for generics was $0.50 in both years. By 2004, the median copayment
for brand-name drugs was $3.00 and that for generics was $1.00.
Prescribing Limits. States have much ﬂexibility in how prescription drugs are dispensed
in their Medicaid programs. Medicaid federal law states only that beneﬁts such as
prescription drugs must be provided so they are “sufﬁcient in amount, duration and
scope to reasonably achieve their purpose” (Crowley et al., 2005). Federal regulations
also allow states to place appropriate limits on quantities per prescription and other
utilization control methods.
Although most states impose prescribing limits (deﬁned as restrictions on the quantity
of medication in one prescription or the number of prescriptions per month), there is
variation in the speciﬁc nature and the extent. Only a few states impose limits on how
many prescriptions per month a beneﬁciary may receive, and the use of this policy has
changedlittleoverthestudyperiod.In1990,12stateslimitedthenumberofprescriptions
permonth,andin2004,15statesimposesuchlimits(seeTable1).16 Limitingthequantity
ofpillsineachprescriptionisamorecommonplacepolicy,anditsusehasincreasedsince
14 See http://ccf.georgetown.edu/pdfs/recontable020906.pdf, accessed July 2006.
15 Inﬂation adjustments were undertaken using the Consumer Price Index.
16 NewYorkimposesnomonthlylimit,butthestatedoesimposeanannuallimitof40prescriptions
per beneﬁciary. This limit may be overridden with physician approval.46 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
1990. In 1990, 29 states placed limits on how many pills are allowed in each prescription;
this number grew to 43 states in 2004. However, a large number of states introduced
these limits between 1990 and 1996 rather than in more recent periods. In both 1996 and
2000, around 40 states placed limits on the quantity of pills per prescription.17 Table 1
demonstrates, moreover, that among states with prescribing limits the stringency of the
restrictions has remained fairly constant over time.
Generic and Low-Cost Drugs. Medicaid law requires states to cover all FDA-approved
medications by pharmaceutical manufacturers who have rebate agreements with the
federal government. However, states may require or encourage the use of generic medi-
cations, in ways beyond the use of tiered copayment systems already discussed.18 States
may also require physicians to prescribe the lowest cost multisource drug ﬁrst. Often
called “fail-ﬁrst” or step therapy requirement, this policy requires an individual to use
and “fail” on a particular drug—the lowest cost one—before Medicaid allows a higher
priced alternative.
Analysis of the data reveals that generic drug policies are receiving increased attention
fromthestates.AssummarizedinTable1,in1990only12statesrequiredthatphysicians
prescribe generics when available. By 2004 this number had grown to 41 states. The
period between 2000 and 2004 saw a large increase in states mandating generics—from
33 states in 2000 to 41 in 2004.
The data in Table 1 also reveal that states use “fail-ﬁrst” policies less frequently than
other generic drug policies, but have increased the use of these policies in recent years.
In 1996 (the ﬁrst year data are available for this measure) only 8 states had such a policy
in place. By 2004 this number had grown to 14.
Prior Authorization Policies. States have the ﬂexibility to require prior authorization
of drugs within their Medicaid prescription drug programs. Under these laws, states
may require that physicians request and receive permission before a particular drug
can be prescribed and dispensed.19 Sometimes a prior authorization program works in
conjunction with a “formulary” or “preferred drug list (PDL).” A PDL is a list of drugs
available to Medicaid beneﬁciaries without prior authorization. All other drugs require
prior authorization or approval by the state Medicaid ofﬁce. By law, even a drug not on
a state’s PDL must be made available through a request for prior approval made by a
physician to the state. PDLs are required to include all drugs made by manufacturers
with rebate agreements in effect with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). There are some exceptions to this rule such as the ability to exclude a certain
high-cost drug from the PDL if it already contains a similar drug.
17 Twenty-two states also report limits on the number of reﬁlls per prescription in the 2004 NPC
survey, and this number has not changed much since 1990. Moreover, many of the reﬁll limits
applyonlyoveratimeperiod,suchasﬁvereﬁllsper6-monthperiod,andareusedinconjunction
with quantity limits of 30-day supplies per prescription.
18 States may also offer pharmacists an incentive fee to distribute generic drugs. These policies are
used less often by the states, with only six states having such a policy in 2004. These policies
may also indirectly affect beneﬁciary access to brand name drugs.
19 If states operate a prior authorization program, they must provide a response within 24 hours
of a request for a prescription drug and must provide a 72-hour emergency supply of the
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TABLE 2
Policy Stringency by State, Selected Years, 1990–2004
Mean Value for All States
Stringency Measure 1990 1996 2000 2004
Number of policies from set of ﬁve older policies 2.32 3.08 3.27 3.83
Number of policies from set of eight total policies N/A 3.22 3.47 5.10
Utilization restriction index (Index 1) 4.43 6.67 8.13 17.23
Cost-sharing index (Index 2) $9.22 $14.94 $16.12 $29.65
Source: Author calculations from NPC and MEPS data.
Table 1 shows that prior authorization programs have been prevalent among the states
throughout the study period: 40 states had prior authorization programs in 1991 (ﬁrst
year data are available on this measure) and 49 states had a program in place in 2004.
However, PDLs are a new phenomenon that states have rapidly adopted during the
past 5 years. Because the implementation of a PDL often (but not always) comes with
a considerable lag after a state legislature authorizes its development, our data report
the implementation dates rather than the authorization dates. In 2000, no states had yet
implemented a PDL. In 2001, only 2 states (Florida and Georgia) had implemented a
PDL.20 By 2004 fully 30 states had PDL programs in place.
Trends in the Scope of State Restrictions
One measure of a state’s overall activism in controlling Medicaid prescription drug
access is the number of policies in place. We examine ﬁve important policies for which
we have data over the entire study period: copayments, generic substitution, limits
on number of prescriptions, limits on quantity per prescription, and the use of prior
approval. We also consider three additional policies for which we only have data for
later years: tiered copayments, fail-ﬁrst policies, and PDLs. Table 2 compares states’ use
of these policies in 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2004.21 The table shows the mean number of
policies in place per state in each year of our analysis.
The comparisons in the ﬁgure demonstrate a substantial upward trend in states’ pre-
scription drug access restrictions over time. Among the ﬁve older policies, the mean
number of policies per state in 1990 was 2.32. By 2004, the mean number of policies
per state was 3.83. Adding data on states’ adoption of the three newer policies (tiered
copays, fail-ﬁrst, PDLs) also shows increasing use over time. We observe that when
states adopt new policy tools, they tend to do so without substantially reducing their
use of other policies. On average, a state had 3.08 of the 5 older policies in place in 1996,
20 Michigan had authorized but not implemented a PDL in 2001. Data were compiled by the au-
thors from information on state PDL passage obtained from the National Council of State Legis-
lators (NCSL) found at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/medicaidrx.htm, with imple-
mentation dates determined from states’ Medicaid websites. Tennessee also has a PDL but is
not included in our data set.
21 Data on prior authorization policies in 1991 is reported in the 1990 count of policies.48 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
and only 3.22 of the 8 total policies. By 2004, this average had grown to 5.10 of the 8
policies compared to 3.83 of the 5 older policies.
One shortcoming of using a simple count of policies is that it assumes each type of
restriction is equally stringent. Ideally we would want to create some weighting system
thatputsgreateremphasisonpoliciesthataremorebinding.Forexample,aprescription
drugquantitylimitmightbemorebindingthanafail-ﬁrstpolicyifbeneﬁciariestypically
take a large number of drugs but few of them are brand-name drugs. We also might
want to measure the stringency of copay levels used in a state in terms of how much
that implies a typical person would have to pay. Ideally we would create these indexes
by measuring the impact of each state’s set of cost control policies on a representative
national population of Medicaid beneﬁciaries (currently exposed to no cost containment
restrictions). We could then use this measure to capture the restrictiveness of the cost
control policies in each state, and it would be more meaningful than a simple count of
policies. Based on this intuition we create two indexes of states’ policy restrictiveness.
Index 1 measures prescription utilization constraints that an average individual may be
subject to under a certain state’s Medicaid policy in a certain year. It is calculated as the
sum of the number of prescription drugs an average individual takes that exceeds the
state’s prescription limit per month (if any), plus the total number of brand-name drugs
he/she takes if the state has a PDL, fail-ﬁrst or generic substitution law (each considered
separately). This sum measures the cumulative number of prescription drug restrictions
to which a person might be subject by the Medicaid program.
Index 2 measures the potential prescription drug cost-sharing burden faced under a
state’s Medicaid rules by an average individual in a given year. It is calculated by
applying the maximum copayment amount a state may require times the number of
prescription drugs that the average individual takes. If a state has a tiered copayment in
place,adifferentcopaymentisappliedtobrandedandgenericdrugs.Thecopaymentson
each drug are summed to form the total cost-sharing amount for the average individual.
Although we would ideally calculate these indexes for the Medicaid population not
currently subject to these restrictions, there is no such counterfactual in the real world.
Since in real life the use of drugs by currently Medicaid-insured individuals is possibly
“contaminated”bytheactualimpactofMedicaidpharmacyrestrictions,weuseanation-
ally representative population of those who are privately insured to construct Index 1
and Index 2. Although this sample is not ideal because private insurance may also carry
prescription restrictions, and the health status of privately insured individuals is likely
to differ from those on Medicaid, we know that these individuals certainly did not face
the restrictions imposed by Medicaid.22 It is also clearly an improved way to capture
22 It is clear that we should not use the Medicaid population in a certain state to simulate the
impact of the policies since they have already been exposed to the policy. Similar policies may
also be used by private sector individuals but it is highly unlikely that the same policies are
used in a given state’s Medicaid and private polices as the private market’s use of policies is
generally not varying by state but rather by the type of policy. As there is no way to obtain a
population not subject to any prescription drug controls in these times, we believe that using
theprivatesectorpopulationisthemostappropriateforthismeasuregivennoreasontobelieve
that there is a correlation with a state’s Medicaid policies and our national sample of privately
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variation in policies across states relative to a simple count. Furthermore, there is prece-
dent for this kind of approach in the health insurance literature as our measure of
stringency of each state’s policy is similar in spirit to the measures Currie and Gruber pi-
oneered in 1996 for summarizing the stringency of Medicaid eligibility rules for women
and children.
We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) household survey, a
nationally representative data set on the health care use and expenditures of the civil-
ian noninstitutionalized population. Supplementary ﬁles of the MEPS provide detailed
information on respondent prescription drug use. We draw a random sample of 1000
privatelyinsuredadultsfromthe2002MEPSsurvey.23 Weretaindataontheindividual’s
prescription drug usage, including drug name, quantity, dosage, and duration of use.
To construct our indexes we assume that all of these 1000 individuals live in a certain
state/year (e.g., New York in 1992) and calculate the hypothetical impact of the relevant
Medicaid pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions on each individual. After calculating the Index
values for each individual, we construct values for each state and year by calculating the
average value of each Index for the state–year pair (e.g., NY 92). We repeat this exercise
for each state and year. The result is an index that varies at the state by year level. Thus,
the state by year values of Index 1 and Index 2 reﬂect the extent of state pharmacy
restrictions relative to other states and years, subject to the caveats above. We believe
that these indexes serve as an additional validity check on other ways we measure a
state’s policy environment in this article.
Because we do not have detailed data on state policies as they apply to individual
drugs, these index variables are somewhat crude approximations. For example, co-
payment amounts in some states may vary by drug or avenue of Medicaid eligibility.
Additionally, only select individual drug classes are subject to fail-ﬁrst requirements or
prior authorization, and we do not have detailed lists of the drugs that appear on PDLs
for our entire sample period. Nonetheless, we can observe the number and type (brand
vs. generic) of drugs an individual takes and use this information in conjunction with
the state policies to determine the maximum copayment amount an individual would
face, and the potential utilization restrictions they could face, if they lived in each state
in each year. Table 2 reports the mean value of Index 1 and Index 2 across states in each
year of our analysis. Consistent with our data on the counts of policies per state, the
table shows an increase in state policy restrictions over the study period, particularly
since 2000.
DO STATE RESTRICTIONS REDUCE PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING?
Our analysis of data from 1990 to 2004 shows that states now employ a much larger set
of restrictions to control Medicaid prescription drug expenditures than they did in the
past and that this trend has intensiﬁed since 2000. Despite these general trends, the data
demonstrate considerable variation across the states—in the speciﬁc policies used, in
the scope of beneﬁt restrictions, and in the extent of policy changes over time.
23 Results are extremely similar using a random sample of 1,000 privately insured individuals of
any age, a random sample of adults of any insurance status, and a random sample of adult
Medicaid beneﬁciaries. Results are also similar if data are taken from the 1996 MEPS rather than
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Whether these beneﬁt restrictions as a whole or in some combinations are effective in
reducing states’ expenditures is a critical question for policy, but we have little evidence
to date. This is presumably due to the lack of a systematic compilation of state policies
and to the difﬁculties of separating out their effect on state expenditures from the
numerous other factors that may be operating simultaneously. A variety of studies have
examined the effects of state Medicaid pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions but have generally
analyzed the effect of a single policy rather than a state’s overall policy environment
and often use data from only one or two states.24 Most of these studies also focus on the
effects of a policy on drug access or usage rather than on state expenditures. There is in
fact very little work looking at the impact of Medicaid policy changes on state Medicaid
spending.
Related Literature
In one of the earliest studies, Nelson et al. (1984) used time-series Medicaid claims data
fornearly18,000beneﬁciariesinSouthCarolinaandfoundan11percentdropinaverage
monthly prescriptions following the 1977 implementation of a $0.50 copayment. This
decline was signiﬁcantly greater than in the comparison state of Tennessee that did not
have cost sharing.
Usingthe1992CurrentMedicareBeneﬁciarySurvey,StuartandZacker(1999)examined
the impact of Medicaid copays ranging between $0.50 and $3.00 in 38 states. They found
that elderly and disabled Medicaid beneﬁciaries residing in copayment states had lower
rates of prescription drug use than their counterparts in noncopayment states. After
controlling for demographic and state policy differences, they found that the disparity is
due primarily to a reduced likelihood of ﬁlling any prescription, and that the disparity
was greatest for beneﬁciaries in fair or poor health.
Additional studies have looked at the effects of limiting the number of prescriptions per
monthforMedicaidbeneﬁciaries(Soumeraietal.,1991;Soumeraietal.,1994;Martinand
McMillan, 1996). These studies have found that prescription limits were associated with
a decreased usage of drugs and increased hospital admissions. Martin and McMillan
(1996) looked at a 1991 Georgia policy that reduced monthly reimbursable prescriptions
from six to ﬁve. They utilized a quasi-experimental, retrospective, 12-month interrupted
time-series analysis and found that prescription drug usage fell by 9.9 percent and bene-
ﬁciarieshadalteredprescriptiondrugregimenswithpotentialforclinicalconsequences.
Other studies that have examined the impact of state pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions on
program costs (not access to drugs) include several on prior authorization restrictions.25
Bloom and Jacobs (1985) used a pre-post design in West Virginia of the drug cimetidine,
which decreased in use after prior authorization was required; Kotzan et al. (1993)
looked at Georgia data and use of H2 blockers and NSAIDs and found that use of
24 A comprehensive review of the literature on the impact of pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions in
private and public insurance programs is contained in Hoadley (2005).
25 Some studies have examined the effect of other Medicaid pharmacy beneﬁt program features.
Maximum allowable cost (MAC) lists are lists of generic drugs and maximum reimbursements
for them similar to the federal upper limit (FUL) list. MAC lists are either more inclusive or list
lower prices than the FUL list. Abramson et al. (2004) report that states with MAC lists said they
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these drugs decreased after prior authorization was required; and Smalley et al. (1995)
found similar effects of prior authorization for NSAIDs in Tennessee Medicaid claims.
Dranove(1989)andMooreandNewman(1993)foundevidencethattheuseofMedicaid
formularies substantially changes prescribing behavior, a ﬁnding echoed in recent work
by Murawski and Abdelgawad (2005) on Medicaid PDLs.
In summary, from the literature above and from several published reviews (MacKin-
non and Kumar, 2001; Soumerai, 2004; Soumerai et al., 1993; Hoadley, 2005), there is
evidence that copayments, prescribing limits and utilization management strategies re-
duce Medicaid beneﬁciaries’ use of drugs. These studies shed light on the impact of
state restrictions on drug usage and access but are of limited scope and in many cases
employ a research design that has been subject to criticism (MacKinnon and Kumar,
2001; Soumerai, 2004). Nor do they tell us the combined effect of the current extent and
scope of restrictions on state Medicaid prescription expenditures.
Our systematic collection of policy data that covers all states over a long time period
allows us to test the implications of state pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions for prescription
drug expenditure growth using a rigorous research design. We combine our data on
state policies with data on each state’s annual Medicaid prescription drug expenditures
and characteristics of the state Medicaid population, obtained from the CMS. Using
multivariate regression analysis, we examine whether a state’s use of prescription drug
beneﬁt restrictions has reduced the pace at which prescription drug expenditures have
grown, after controlling for other inﬂuences on these expenditures.
Data
The data set used to test our hypotheses is composed mainly of information made
publiclyavailablebyCMS(formerlytheHealthCareFinancingAdministration(HCFA)).
The key outcome variable is the cost of prescription drugs under the Medicaid program
in each year and state. States reported their annual total Medicaid prescription drug
expenditures (as well as other program data) by state and by year until 1998 through
what was known as the HCFA-2082 form.26 CMS then compiled these data by state and
year 1991–1998 and released the output to researchers. Since January 1999, as a result
of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA), it became mandatory for states to submit data
quarterly at the micro level (person-level enrollment and claims data) to CMS, which
then creates these aggregates themselves using the Medicaid Statistical Information
System (MSIS).27
The MSIS data also contain measures of the total number of beneﬁciaries, total Medicaid
costs, and the number of beneﬁciaries with any Medicaid drug utilization that year.
Medicaid data from this source have been widely used by researchers studying the
Medicaid program and its expenses, including Baugh et al. (2004), Liska et al. (1997),
Holahan and Liska (1997), Ku and Garrett (2000), Holahan and Garret (2001), Holahan
and Bruen (2003), and Holahan and Ghosh (2005). The Urban Institute has examined
26 The ofﬁcial name was “Statistical Report on Medical Care: Eligibles, Recipients, Payments and
Services.”
27 Several states had been submitting micro-level data to CMS using the MSIS system even prior
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these data carefully over a long period and note several details of which one must
be cautious (e.g., Bruen, 2000, discusses the use of the Medicaid prescription drug
data in detail, suggesting that one drops certain states due to noted problems in their
reporting).28 Their work also speaks to the external validity of these data; e.g., the
estimatesoftheelasticityofMedicaidenrollmenttothestateunemploymentratederived
from the Current Population Survey and the HCFA-2082 reports are very comparable
(Appendix Table 1 in Dorn, Smith, and Garrett, 2005).
Prescription drug spending data provided by CMS are nominal dollars, reported by
federal ﬁscal year (October–September) and represent gross amounts prior to the receipt
of rebates by manufacturers.29 These reports speciﬁcally exclude any patient copay-
ments, measuring only the amount that was paid by the state Medicaid system to the
pharmacy.30 These only cover enrollees for whom Medicaid pays the pharmacy claim
(thus excludes those covered by fully capitated managed care plans). If prescriptions
are provided to a Medicaid patient during a hospital stay, those expenses are included
in the inpatient hospital claim, thus these are only outpatient prescription expenses.
Similarly, in most states medications provided in nursing homes are included in the
nursing home’s reimbursement rate. As Medicaid restrictions do not apply in an in-
patient setting (e.g., since something like a fail-ﬁrst or prior-approval approach is not
feasible) and do not apply to capitated managed care plans, these features of the data
set are not problematic for our study.
As Banthin and Miller (2006) point out, it is important to control for the nature of the
population enrolled in Medicaid when looking at trends in Medicaid prescription drug
outcomes over time. Accordingly, we account for several features of a state’s Medicaid
population in our analysis. States generally do not require fully capitated managed care
entities that serve Medicaid beneﬁciaries to submit a breakdown of the costs to the
states. Other forms of Medicaid managed care, such as primary care case management
(PCCM), still involve pharmacy claims being paid by the state. Therefore, we control for
the level of fully capitated managed care penetration in the state/year in our analysis. We
expect that as states expand programs to cover more enrollees (in ways not picked up
28 For example, they note that there are four states (Arizona, Tennessee, Hawaii, and Oklahoma)
that report no prescription drug recipients in 1990 and 1997. In addition, Ku and Bruen (1999)
note that Oregon’s reporting of the number of enrollees in the HCFA-2082 forms has shown
some inconsistency since 1994 and recommend robustness checks on results obtained from
these data after dropping these states. We conduct these tests and report the results in the third
section of this article.
29 This is the appropriate cost measure for this study, which investigates only the effect of policies
thatattempttocontrolconsumerdrugusage.Ifrebatesareincorporatedinthecostmeasure,the
pharmacybeneﬁtrestrictionsvariablesmayinadvertentlypickuptheeffectofrebateagreements
that are contemporaneously enacted. On the other hand, a policy such as required generic
substitution may mean that the rebates also decrease, so that the cost savings that appear to
result to the program may be overstated. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing
this out.
30 These payments represent the total cost of the medications and do not take into account the
Federal Matching Assistance Percent of the total costs that the federal government will refund
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by the other controls), costs would naturally rise and thus we incorporate data on the
number of people receiving beneﬁts under the Medicaid program. Prescription drug use tends
to be much higher among the elderly and disabled, and their costs may have also grown
at a faster rate (Baugh et al., 2004). For these reasons, we take into account the percentage
of a state’s Medicaid beneﬁciaries that are elderly, and the percentage that are blind or disabled.
All of the Medicaid population measures also come from CMS. We obtain most of these
from the 2082-MSIS forms. The fraction enrolled in Medicaid managed care programs
also comes from CMS but from a different reporting system.31
Toaccountforothertime-varyingdifferencesacrossstatesthatmayaffectthecharacteris-
tics of the Medicaid population, we also include the state’s unemployment rate, population
density,a n dt h enumber of physicians per capita in each model. The unemployment rate
comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, state population data come from the U.S.
Census, and the number of physicians comes from the American Medical Association,
as reported in various editions of the U.S. Statistical Abstract.
Because of some missing data for early years, we do not use 1991 information. As
our growth rates are calculated from base year to next, the ﬁnal data set for analy-
sis thus covers 1993–2003 and contains observations on 49 states (excluding Arizona
and Tennessee, including District of Columbia). Summary statistics are provided in
Table 3.
Methods
We assume that the annual growth rate in a state’s Medicaid prescription drug ex-
penditures is determined by policy actions taken to control spending growth, by both
ﬁxed and time-variant characteristics of the state, and by national time trends that af-
fect all states.32 We test our hypotheses about how a state’s adoption of policies affects
expenditure growth with an empirical model speciﬁed in the following way:
31 CMS reports data from 1995 onward showing the percent of the Medicaid population in man-
aged care. As some forms of managed care do not include prescription drugs (i.e., PCCM type
managed care), while others do (fully capitated managed care), this means that it is important
to know enrollment by type of managed care for the purposes of this study. CMS reports from
1995 onward in older style Adobe Acrobat format the enrollment numbers in different man-
aged care contracts (and their capitation status) by state, county, and plan name. A typical year
contains about 60 pages of data. These pages were scanned, hand-edited, and then aggregated
to the state level to compute the percent of the Medicaid population in fully capitated managed
care. For data from 1991 to 1995, hard-copy tables from CMS were entered into a database and
processed in a similar manner.
32 This study design follows the literature that has looked at the effect of state policies on the
growthof costs in other programs,for example, state workerscompensation programs(Danzon
and Harrington, 2001). Annual growth rates are also the typical outcome in analyses of the
growth in general Medicaid expenditures ( e.g., Holahan and Liska, 1997; Holahan and Bruen,
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Variables, 1993–2003
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Annual pct growth state prescription drug expenditures 0.16 0.11
Annual pct growth state Medicaid expenditures 0.10 0.11
Annual pct growth state Medicaid beneﬁciaries 0.06 0.14
Annual pct growth beneﬁciaries over 65 0.02 0.15
Annual pct growth disabled and blind beneﬁciaries 0.06 0.12
Annual change in pct beneﬁciaries in capitated mgd care 0.04 0.16
State unemployment rate 5.03 1.37
State population density 334.14 1,215.03
Number of physicians per capita in state 238.63 83.55
Total number of policies in state 3.45 1.23
State has four or more policies 0.45 0.50
State requires generic substitution 0.62 0.49
State has any copayment 0.65 0.48
State has tiered copayment 0.11 0.31
State has limits on number of prescriptions per month 0.25 0.43
State has limits on quantity per prescription 0.83 0.38
State has preferred drug list 0.07 0.25
State has any fail-ﬁrst restrictions 0.11 0.31
State has any prior authorization 0.83 0.38
State index of utilization restrictions (Index 1) 8.29 5.93
State index of cost-sharing restrictions (Index 2) 17.11 14.81
Number of observations 533
 Expendituresst = α + β1Restrictionsst + β2 CapitatedManagedCarePenetrationst
+ β3 MedicaidRxPopulationst + β4 Elderlyst + β5 Disabledst
+ β6PopulationDensityst + β7UnemploymentRatest
+ β8PhysiciansperCapitast + States + Yeart + State ∗ Timest + est
(1)
where subscript s stands for a state and t stands for a year. Our dependent vari-
able is the annual percentage growth rate in Medicaid prescription drug expenditures
(Expendituresst − Expendituresst−1)/Expendituress,t − 1. Our key independent variables
measure the set of pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions (Restrictionsst) described previously in
our study. We use alternative speciﬁcations to look at the general and speciﬁc effects of
different types of policies described earlier.
Studies of the effects of state policies must be careful to consider the source of identiﬁ-
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and after it implements a policy, researchers could inadvertently attribute the effect of
some other phenomenon that occurs in that state during those years to be the effect of
a policy. Looking at a cross section of states at a point in time is also not ideal because
differences in outcomes between states with and without policies could obviously re-
ﬂect other underlying differences between states. In our approach, we minimize these
concerns by using information both across states and over time for almost all states.
Weincludestateﬁxedeffectsinallmodelstoaccountforthefactthatdifferentstatesmay
beonpermanentlydifferentgrowthtrajectories.(Forexample,largerstatesmaybemore
efﬁcient due to economies of scale and thus see lower cost growth rates than smaller
states.) We also take account of the fact that in certain years, the entire nation may face
cost shocks. Studies that focus just on one state cannot separate out these effects. We
include year ﬁxed effects in all our models to capture the effect of national phenomena
that may affect drug spending (e.g., the introduction of a new drug or the adoption of a
new treatment protocol).
Although state ﬁxed effects account for the fact that states may be growing at different
rates during this time period, they do not account for the possibility that these growth
rates themselves may change over time due to some other trends in the state (that may
be spuriously correlated with the enactment of a policy). To the extent that a state’s
Medicaid program changes in composition in ways relevant for costs, the characteristics
of the state Medicaid program, population, and economic conditions may be important
determinants of cost growth. We include several time-varying state controls to account
for this, as discussed above.
Toaccountforthepossibilitythatotherunmeasuredstatetrends(e.g.,industrialdecline)
could be correlated with the timing of policies, in some model speciﬁcations we include
a separate linear time trend for each state. In this speciﬁcation, our identiﬁcation comes
from a very robust study design in which we test whether a state that adopts a policy
sees a change in its annual pattern of expenditure growth relative to the nation as a
whole, relative to the state’s underlying growth rate that iscommon across all years, and
relative to anything else that may be happening in the state that may cause its growth
rate to increase or decrease linearly over time relative to other states.
Results
We ﬁrst estimate Equation (1) with each state’s policy actions measured as counts of
policies. Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes the total number of policies in place in each
state and year. Our second model speciﬁcation includes a 0–1 dummy variable with 1
indicating that a state has four or more policies. This approach follows recent work by
Cunningham (2005) using the CTS to look at whether state restrictions in the 2000/01–
2003 period have affected beneﬁciaries’ perceived access to needed medications.
The results from this estimation are presented in Table 4. The ﬁrst column of the table
presents estimates using the total count of policies without control variables, as a crude
look at whether trend differences suggestive of policy effects are visible in the raw data.
The second and third columns report these estimates with control variables, and with
state linear time trends, respectively. The ﬁnal two columns of the table report estimates
using the indicator for whether a state has four or more policy restrictions, without
and with state linear time trends, respectively. All speciﬁcations include state and year56 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
TABLE 4
State Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditure Growth, 1993–2003, Models With Policy
Counts
Dependent Variable = Rx Expenditure(t)/Rx Expenditure(t−1) − 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls Controls Controls Controls
Explanatory Variable Controls Only and Trends Only and Trends
Total number of policies −0.0131
∗∗
−0.0188
∗∗∗
−0.0260
∗∗∗
0.0061 0.0062 0.0081
Four or more policies −0.0256
∗∗
−0.0233
0.0124 0.0166
Pct change in Medicaid 0.2302
∗∗∗
0.2008
∗∗∗
0.2311
∗∗∗
0.1992
∗∗∗
beneﬁciaries 0.0798 0.0598 0.0819 0.0611
Pct change in beneﬁciaries 0.1211
∗
0.1195
∗∗
0.1232
∗
0.1189
∗∗
over age 65 0.0657 0.0589 0.0662 0.0588
Pct change in beneﬁciaries 0.0444 0.0186 0.0428 0.0187
who are disabled 0.0826 0.0747 0.0843 0.0754
Change in pct beneﬁciaries −0.0767
∗∗
−0.0710
∗∗
−0.0770
∗∗
−0.0712
∗∗
in capitated managed
care
0.0327 0.0334 0.0332 0.0337
State and year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear state time trends No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.0304 0.2965 0.3774 0.2877 0.3654
N 533 533 533 533 533
Note: Robust standard errors appear below the coefﬁcient estimates. All models include an inter-
cept term. Models with control variables also include the unemployment rate, population density,
and physicians per capita.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
∗∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are reported below coefﬁcients; statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients are indicated with asterisks.
TheestimatesintheﬁrstcolumnofTable4,withoutcontrolvariables,areakintoplotting
the state cost growth trends over time and showing a trend break after the adoption of
the policies. These estimates show that even when we control only for a ﬁxed national
year effect and state ﬁxed effects, increasing the total number of beneﬁt restrictions
appears to reduce expenditure growth by about 1.3 percent, and this effect is statistically
signiﬁcant.
In the models that control for other state characteristics, both with and without lin-
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statisticallysigniﬁcant.Inthesemodels,theestimatedcoefﬁcientis−0.0188and−0.0260,
respectively, indicating that states who adopted one additional policy saw annual ex-
penditure growth reduced by about 2 to 21/ 2 percentage points below what it otherwise
would have been. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 4 show that in states and years in
which four or more policies are employed, prescription drug expenditure growth is also
slower. In the model with controls and state ﬁxed effects only, the four-plus policy indi-
cator is statistically signiﬁcant and the results suggest that annual expenditure growth is
lowered by 2.6 percent; however, when linear state time trends are added to the models
this policy measure loses statistical signiﬁcance.
Onemightexpectthatdifferentpolicieswillhavedifferenteffectsonexpendituregrowth.
Thus, the results in Table 4 could mask substantial heterogeneity in the impact of each
restriction. To account for this we examine the effects of state beneﬁt restrictions when
each individual policy variable is included in the model. One concern in estimating
models that include all of the policy variables is that there could be a high degree of
multicollinearity between them. Our analysis of state actions did not point to a system-
atic clustering of policy activity, but we nevertheless examined the correlation matrix
between the state policies and saw that the policy variables are not highly collinear: the
correlation coefﬁcient between any two laws does not exceed 0.28, and on average it is
0.08 in absolute terms. In part to counter multicollinearity concerns, and to capture state
differences in policy stringency, we also estimate models that include our constructed
stringencyindexes(Index1andIndex2)asthemeasuresofstates’Medicaidrestrictions.
The estimation results for these models are reported in Table 5. As in the previous
table, our ﬁrst model includes only the policy variables to explore whether raw trend
differences suggest signiﬁcant policy effects. The models in columns 2 and 3 add control
variables and state linear time trends, respectively. The estimates incorporating our
constructed Index measures are reported in column 4 and column 5, ﬁrst with only
control variables and then with state linear time trends. All models include state and
year ﬁxed effects.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows that when we control only for a ﬁxed national year
effect and state ﬁxed effects, all of the policies have a negative effect on states’ prescrip-
tion drug expenditure growth, but only the effect of tiered copayments is statistically
signiﬁcantandthatisonlymarginallyso.Theestimateswithcontrolsincluded,reported
in column 2, show similar results but now the effects of PDLs and prior authorization
are statistically signiﬁcant. When linear state time trends are included (column 3) prior
authorization becomes statistically insigniﬁcant but the effect of PDLs is strengthened
and that of tiered copayments becomes statistically signiﬁcant again. The estimated ef-
fects of these latter variables are also the largest. With state time trends included, the
coefﬁcient estimates suggest that the use of PDLs reduces states’ annual prescription
drug expenditure growth rates an average of 5.7 percent, and tiered copayments reduce
annual expenditure growth rates by 5.5 percent.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 5 present the results from estimating the models using
the two policy stringency index variables that we developed from the MEPS data. The
estimates show that higher index values are associated with lower prescription drug
expenditure growth, consistent with the results from previous speciﬁcations. Although
the estimated effects of increasing each index by 1 point are much smaller, the effect of
Index 1 (index of utilization restrictions) is statistically signiﬁcant in both the models58 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
TABLE 5
State Medicaid Prescription Drug Expenditure Growth, 1993–2003, Models With Policies
or Index Measures
Dependent Variable = Rx Expenditure(t)/Rx Expenditure(t−1) − 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls Controls Controls Controls
Explanatory Variable Controls Only and Trends Only and Trends
Generic substitution −0.0071 −0.0205 −0.0186
0.0108 0.0128 0.0188
Limits on number of −0.0123 −0.0095 −0.0129
prescriptions 0.0153 0.0212 0.0316
Limits on quantity per −0.0010 0.0008 −0.0059
prescription 0.0143 0.0174 0.0198
Preferred drug list −0.0243 −0.0362
∗
−0.0571
∗∗
0.0183 0.0202 0.0275
Any fail ﬁrst requirement −0.0008 −0.0138 −0.0195
0.0149 0.0190 0.0262
Any copayment −0.0074 −0.0078 −0.0126
0.0153 0.0173 0.0288
Tiered copayment −0.0166 −0.0307 −0.0547
∗∗
0.0151 0.0210 0.0247
Any prior authorization −0.0390
∗∗∗
−0.0335
∗∗
−0.0271
0.0147 0.0152 0.0219
Utilization restrictions −0.0036
∗∗∗
−0.0044
∗∗∗
(Index 1) 0.0012 0.0016
Cost-sharing restrictions −0.0112
∗
−0.0012
(Index 2) 0.0006 0.0009
Pct change in Medicaid 0.2290
∗∗∗
0.2011
∗∗∗
0.2338
∗∗∗
0.2026
∗∗∗
beneﬁciaries 0.0804 0.0604 0.0789 0.0593
Pct change in beneﬁciaries 0.1212
∗
0.1195
∗∗
0.1224
∗
0.1186
∗∗
over age 65 0.0669 0.0597 0.0659 0.0595
Pct change in beneﬁciaries 0.0397 0.0166 0.0471 0.0266
who are disabled 0.0823 0.0746 0.0831 0.0763
Change in pct beneﬁciaries −0.0715
∗∗
−0.0692
∗∗
−0.0774
∗∗
−0.0735
∗∗
in capitated managed
care
0.0338 0.0343 0.0327 0.0332
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TABLE 5
(Continued)
Dependent Variable = Rx Expenditure(t)/Rx Expenditure(t−1) − 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Controls Controls Controls Controls
Explanatory Variable Controls Only and Trends Only and Trends
State and year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear state time trends No No Yes No Yes
R2 0.1616 0.3006 0.3825 0.3006 0.3793
N 533 533 533 533 533
Note: Robust standard errors appear below the coefﬁcient estimates. All models include an inter-
cept term. Model with control variables also include the unemployment rate, population density,
and physicians per capita.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
∗∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
without and with state time trends. Index 2 (index of cost-sharing burden) is marginally
signiﬁcant, but only in the model without state time trends.
In the models in both Tables 4 and 5, several of the control variables relating to the state
Medicaid populations are signiﬁcant, including growth in the total number of beneﬁcia-
ries and growth in those over age 65, which are both positively related to prescription
expenditure growth. The change in the fraction of beneﬁciaries enrolled in capitated
managed care plans is also statistically signiﬁcant and is negatively related to prescrip-
tionexpendituregrowth.Thecoefﬁcientestimatesforstateunemploymentrate,popula-
tiondensity,andnumberofphysicianspercapitaarenotreportedinthetablessincethese
are rarely statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, sensitivity analysis shows that omitting or
including these variables has no effect on the estimated effects of the state policies.
Robustness Checks
Our key results remain largely the same in all models estimated, although there are
some differences regarding which coefﬁcients reach statistical signiﬁcance depending
onwhetherstatelineartimetrendsareincluded.Thequalitativestorythatemergesfrom
the estimates is that states’ pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions tend to decrease prescription
drug expenditure growth, and utilization management policies including PDLS and
tiered copayments tend to have the greatest impact.
To test the robustness of these effects, we examined different ways of entering the
policy measures in the models (not reported in the tables). For example, we entered the
count of policies in each of the four distinct restriction categories (cost sharing, generics,
prescribing limits, prior authorization) rather than the total number of policies. We also
triedenteringthenumberofmoretraditionallimitspolicies(costsharingandprescribing
limits) versus the number of utilization management policies used by the state, as well
as entering the number of older policies as a count of state restrictions in combination60 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
withthenewerpolicies(tieredcopays,failﬁrst,andPDLs)enteredasindividualdummy
variables.
In running our robustness tests we also speciﬁed both our dependent variables and
controlvariablesindifferentways(notreportedinthetables).Weranalternativemodels
in which the dependent variable is the log of expenditure growth (ln(Costt/Costt−1))
rather than the percentage growth. We also ran models in which we experimented with
different subsets of the control variables.
All models produced qualitatively similar results for the policy variables. Different
speciﬁcations suggest slightly different conclusions in terms of the individual policies,
but in general it appears that states that have enacted more policies and those that
use select utilization management policies such PDLs and tiered copayment systems
have seen signiﬁcantly slower prescription expenditure growth rates over the study
period. Although estimates of the effects of these individual policies are not as robust to
speciﬁcationchangesasthoseusingcountsofpolicies,thesetofutilizationmanagement
policiesasawhole(priorauthorization,genericsubstitution,tieredcopays,failﬁrst,and
PDLs) and the set of the newest such policies (tiered copays, fail ﬁrst, and PDLs) are
jointly statistically signiﬁcant in most of the models we estimated.
AnothersetofrobustnesschecksweundertookarebasedonadvicefromUrbanInstitute
publications regarding states for which their quality checks produced concern. These
states are Oregon, Hawaii, and Oklahoma (in addition to Tennessee and Arizona, which
wealsodroppedbecauseoftheirwaiverprograms).Whenthesestatesaredroppedfrom
the models, the results in Table 4 for the total count of policies and the dummy variable
for four or more policies remain similar, as do those for the index variables reported in
Table 5. However, the effects attributable to individual policies in Table 5 changes: the
PDL effect becomes half the size in magnitude and not statistically signiﬁcant, whereas
the prior authorization dummy is now statistically signiﬁcant even with the state time
trends included. In addition, fail-ﬁrst policies are signiﬁcantly and negatively related to
prescription cost growth when state time trends are included, but tiered copayments are
not. Thus, the models with policy counts or indexes are more robust to this check than
is the model with the separate dummy variables for policies.
Overall, the results from all speciﬁcations are consistent in showing that state pharmacy
beneﬁt restrictions have reduced Medicaid prescription drug expenditure growth in
a statistically and economically signiﬁcant manner. Thus, this simple econometric ex-
ercise lends support to the idea that states are seeing reductions in prescription drug
expenditures after enacting pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions in their Medicaid programs.
DISCUSSION
Analysis of state data from 1990 to 2004 shows that states now employ a much larger
set of restrictions on prescription drug access under Medicaid than they did in the past.
This trend has intensiﬁed since 2000 as states have faced increasing budgetary pressures
overall and in their Medicaid programs. The extent to which these new restrictions are
effective in changing prescribing behavior and reducing costs is a critical question for
the states.
OuranalysisofMedicaiddrugexpendituregrowthsuggeststhatthesepoliciesappearto
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policy restrictions may reduce the rate of growth of Medicaid drug expenditures but fail
to reduce overall Medicaid spending. If prescription drug expenditure reductions are
achievedbyreducingaccesstoessentialmedications,thenotherhealthcareexpenditures
may rise. Two reviews of the literature conclude that the effects of Medicaid pharmacy
beneﬁt restrictions on other Medicaid costs remain largely unknown (Soumerai, 2004;
Soumerai et al., 1993), but recent research on states’ use of Medicaid PDLs shows mixed
evidence on their effectiveness from a total program perspective (Lichtenberg, 2005;
Virabhak and Shinogle, 2005; Wilson, Axelsen, and Tang, 2005) and the degree to which
they increase physicians’ administrative costs (Ketcham and Epstein, 2006).
To examine whether states’ prescription drug restrictions have the unintended effect
of raising total Medicaid spending, we estimate a version of Equation (1) using total
Medicaid service expenditures rather than prescription drug expenditures. Data on
each state’s Medicaid expenditures in each year is obtained from the HCFA-2082 form
for1992–1998andfromtheCMSMSISfor1999–2003,alongwiththedataonprescription
drugexpenditures.TotalMedicaidexpendituresrepresenttotalexpendituresonservices
(including both state and federal shares), but no administrative costs.
Because our models do not take into account the full array of policy changes that might
affecttotalMedicaidexpendituresoverthistimeperiod,weestimatethesemodelsusing
only the policy count and index variables rather than trying to separately estimate the
effects of speciﬁc prescription drug restrictions. In this way, we provide evidence of
whether states that enacted more policies or more restrictive policies saw immediate
increases in other expenditures that led to higher total spending growth overall.
Table 6 reports the results of estimation. As in the previous tables, the model in the ﬁrst
column includes only the count of total policies and state and year ﬁxed effects; the
estimate suggests a negative but not statistically signiﬁcant relationship between states’
larger number of prescription drug controls and annual Medicaid spending growth.
The same result obtains when other explanatory control variables are included in the
model (second column). Similarly, the dummy variable for states and years in which
four or more policies are employed is negative but not signiﬁcantly related to overall
expendituregrowth(thirdcolumn).ThemodelintheﬁnalcolumnofTable6thatincludes
the index variables shows that both are negatively related to annual spending growth,
and the cost-sharing policy Index is marginally signiﬁcant. As might be expected if
prescription drug restrictions lead to some increase in use of other health services, the
parameter estimates for the policy measures in Table 6 tend to be smaller than in the
models for Medicaid prescription drug spending.
All models reported in the table include state and year ﬁxed effects but exclude state
time trends. When linear state time trends are included, the estimated policy effects
remain negative and of the same magnitude, but generally of even lesser statistical
signiﬁcance. Overall, we interpret the results as suggesting that states which imposed
greater restrictions on prescription drug access did not see increases in overall Medicaid
spending growth, and may have seen decreases.
CONCLUSIONS
This study presents the ﬁrst systematic description and analysis of state policies limiting
prescription drug access under Medicaid during 1990–2004, documenting their impact62 RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE REVIEW
TABLE 6
State Total Medicaid Expenditure Growth, 1993–2003, Models With Policy Counts or
Index Measures
Dependent Variable = Expenditure(t)/Expenditure(t –1 )–1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Controls Controls Controls
Explanatory Variable Controls Only Only Only
Total number of policies −0.0025 −0.0053
0.0056 0.0049
Four or more policies −0.0040
0.0118
Utilization restrictions −0.0008
(Index 1) 0.0011
Cost-sharing restrictions −0.0010
∗
(Index 2) −0.0006
Pct change in Medicaid 0.3192
∗∗∗
0.3200
∗∗∗
0.3196
∗∗∗
beneﬁciaries 0.0721 0.0725 0.0720
Pct change in 0.0708 0.0713 0.0693
beneﬁciaries over age 65 0.0568 0.0514 0.0562
Pct change in 0.0408 0.0408 0.0442
beneﬁciaries who are
disabled
0.0711 0.0717 0.0715
Change in pct −0.0531
∗∗
−0.0529
∗∗
−0.0530
∗∗
beneﬁciaries in capitated
managed care
0.0254 0.0254 0.0255
State and year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear state time trends No No No No
R2 0.1402 0.3601 0.3774 0.3633
N 533 533 533 533
Note: Robust standard errors appear below the coefﬁcient estimates. All models include an inter-
cept term. Models with control variables also include the unemployment rate, population density,
and physicians per capita.
∗Statistically signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 5 percent.
∗∗∗
Statistically signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
onstates’Medicaidprescriptionspendinggrowth.Thedatashowconsiderablevariation
acrossthestatesinthespeciﬁcpoliciesused,intheextentandscopeofpolicyrestrictions,
and in the extent of policy changes over time. We see substantial variation in the number
and type of policies used by states but a clear upward trend in restrictions over time.DO STATE COST CONTROL POLICIES REDUCE MEDICAID SPENDING 63
We conduct a differences-in-differences analysis of states’ annual prescription drug
expendituregrowth,examiningwhethertherateofgrowthisdifferentafterstatepolicies
are enacted compared to before, in a state that enacted a policy compared to ones
that did not, including controls for state, year, and state time trend effects and for
Medicaidprogramcharacteristics.Estimationresultssupportthehypothesisthatbeneﬁt
restrictions reduce the rate of prescription expenditure growth and do not contribute
to higher Medicaid spending growth overall. The speciﬁc restrictions that signiﬁcantly
reduce cost growth are PDLsand—in some speciﬁcations—tiered copayments and prior
authorization. However, results for these individual policies are not robust to as many
speciﬁcation changes as are the results using various measures of policy counts or
stringency.
It is important to note that our study considers only the effects of pharmacy beneﬁt
restrictions on Medicaid costs and not on access to drugs, health status, or the costs im-
posedonphysicians.33 Furtherresearchintotheimpactofthenewprescribinghurdleson
beneﬁciary health and health care usage is needed. Research into these questions is im-
portant to provide clearer understanding of the efﬁcacy of cost and utilization controls
in Medicaid prescription drug programs and in Medicare Part D since many of the same
controls have been adopted there. The variation in pharmacy beneﬁt restrictions across
states and over time provide fertile ground for research into the impact of state policies
on these outcomes.
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